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 In September of 1957, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas ordered the 
National Guard to prevent black students from entering Central High School in 
Little Rock.  The nine students sought to enter pursuant to a desegregation plan 
adopted by the Little Rock School Board to comply with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of Education.1  Brown had held that racially 
segregated public schools were unconstitutional, but Faubus disagreed.  With 
Faubus’s support, the Arkansas legislature had enacted “interposition” legislation, 
which directed the state to prevent enforcement of Brown until such time as the 
states could ratify a constitutional amendment shifting power over integration 
from the courts to Congress.
2
  Faubus filed suit in the state courts to block 
desegregation in Little Rock, and—citing fears of violence arising from the 
controversy over the City’s schools—he ordered the National Guard to prevent 
any further steps toward integration and maintain order.
3
  
 Governor Faubus’s suit was unsuccessful, and President Eisenhower 
ultimately deployed federal troops to ensure the black students’ safety.  
Continuing public turmoil outside the school, however, led the school board to 
ask the federal district court to postpone implementation of the desegregation 
plan.  That court agreed, but the case—now known as Cooper v. Aaron4—went up 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.  A remarkable opinion signed by all nine justices, 
declared that “[t]he constitutional rights of [the black students] are not to be 
sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the 
actions of the Governor and Legislature.”5  The Court pointedly “answer[ed] the 
                                                 
*
 Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School.  This essay is for my friend Sandy 
Levinson, who taught me that it is possible to love the Constitution deeply while 
questioning nearly everything about it. 
1
 See Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that 
racial segregation in the public schools is unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ordering local school districts to 
desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). 
2
 See Tony A. Freyer, Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-1957, 66 
ARK. HIST. QUARTERLY 145, 153-57 (2007). 
3
 See id. at 157-60; Speech of Gov. Orval E. Faubus, Sept. 2, 1957, available at 
http://www.southerncolloqrhetoric.net/web/resources/Faubus570902.pdf.   
4
 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
5
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premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by 
our holding in the Brown case.”6  Invoking “basic constitutional propositions,” the 
Court insisted that “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution. . . .  It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the 
land” and therefore binding on all state officials, including Governor Faubus.7 
 No one today doubts that Cooper’s result.  Scholars and judges have had 
considerably more trouble, however, with the Court’s statement that “the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”  During the 
Reagan years, Attorney General Edwin Meese challenged judicial supremacy as a 
way of attacking liberal precedents like Roe v. Wade.
8
  And as the Court turned 
(somewhat) to the right under Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts, 
liberal academics began to talk about “taking the Constitution away from the 
courts.”9  Other scholars have stressed the positive contributions to constitutional 
development of legislators, executive branch officials, and popular social 
movements.
10
  And both lawyers and judges have had to grapple with difficult 




 The assault on judicial supremacy has had the salutary effect of 
highlighting both the limits of judicial review and the important roles that other 
actors play in shaping constitutional meaning. Outside the academy, however, 
there is little evidence of public dissatisfaction with judicial review or enthusiasm 
for alternative forms of popular constitutionalism.  This, I submit, is because the 
                                                 
6
 Id. at 17. 
7
 Id. at 18. 
8
 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 
TULANE L. REV. 979 (1987). 
9
 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); 
see also LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
10
 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & JOHN FEREJOHN: A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Jack M. Balkin, How 
Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the 
New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING (1999). 
11
 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (exploring Congress’s 
authority to interpret the Constitution pursuant to its power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments). 
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important rule of law function fulfilled by the Supreme Court has never amounted 
to “judicial supremacy” in the first place. 
I. The Revolt Against Judicial Supremacy 
Article VI of the Constitution requires all public officials, state and 
national, to swear an oath “to support this Constitution.” 12  All lawyers and 
military personnel make a similar promise.
13
  The breadth of this commitment 
makes any notion that the Constitution somehow “belongs” to the courts hard to 
sustain.  Each of these posts, after all, may require constitutional judgments—
whether it is a President deciding whether or not to sign a bill, a soldier 
determining whether to follow an order, or a policeman considering whether he 
may legally search a house.   
All naturalized citizens, moreover, must take a similar oath.
14
 This reflects 
the fact that all citizens are frequently invited to consider arguments about the 
constitutionality of various laws and proposals or to assess which would-be 
officials would be the best guardians of constitutional values.
15
  And of course 
many social movements, from the civil rights movement to the Tea Party, have 
framed their arguments in explicitly constitutional terms.  Everyone involved in 
Cooper—including Governor Faubus, President Eisenhower, the Arkansas 
legislature, the Little Rock School Board, and even the private citizens gathered 
outside the high school—had not only a right but an obligation to interpret the 
Constitution as it bore on the situation before them (although many of them 
undoubtedly got the Constitution wrong). 
                                                 
12
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3. 
13
 See, e.g., State Bar of Texas, Oath of Office Form, 
https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForLawyers/MembershipInf
oandServices/NewLawyerFormsFees/OathofOfficeForm.pdf (visited April 19, 
2014); U.S. Army Center of Military History, Oaths of Enlistment and Oaths of 
Office, http://www.history.army.mil/html/faq/oaths.html (visited April 19, 2014). 
14
 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Naturalization Oath of Allegiance 
to the United States of America, http://www.uscis.gov/us-
citizenship/naturalization-test/naturalization-oath-allegiance-united-states-america 
(visited April 19, 2014). 
15
 See, e.g., Sen. Barack Obama, Speech at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center, Aug. 1, 2007, available at http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-
woodrow-wilson-center/p13974 (promising to “provide our intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies with the tools they need to track and take out the 
terrorists without undermining our Constitution and our freedom”).  
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In this sense, as Sanford Levinson has pointed out, America espouses a 
“Protestant” approach to constitutional meaning.16  We have a “priesthood of all 
[constitutional] believers,” in which each individual can read and interpret the 
constitutional text for himself.  And yet, we also undeniably have a “priesthood” 
whose interpretations have a privileged role.  The literature on judicial review and 
popular constitutionalism arises out of this tension. 
A. Marbury and Departmentalism 
Cooper’s declaration of judicial supremacy relied directly on Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison17 that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”18  But the 
two cases raised quite different issues.  Marbury concerned the Court’s ability to 
set aside a federal statute that contravened the Constitution in the course of 
resolving a litigated dispute.  Governor Faubus’s challenge to the Court’s 
authority in Cooper, on the other hand, concerned the binding effect of Supreme 
Court precedents on nonjudicial actors not party to a prior decision.  The 
conceptual daylight between these two questions gives rise to a widely-accepted 
form of constitutionalism outside the courts: the departmentalist view that each 
institution of government can (and must) interpret the Constitution for itself in the 
course of its own institutional responsibilities.
19
  
Marbury was difficult precisely because Congress, as well as the judiciary, 
is obliged to interpret the Constitution.  Congress, after all, presumably thought 
that it was acting consistently with the constitution when it enacted the Judiciary 
Act’s provision at issue in Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion readily 
established the Constitution’s supremacy over a conflicting statute, 20  but that 
hardly establishes that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is supreme 
over Congress’s.21  The best reading of Marbury insists simply that the Court has 
jurisdiction to consider cases “arising under” the Constitution, and that when it 
                                                 
16
 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH  27-53 (1988). 
17
 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
18
 Id. at 177; see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (relying on this language). 
19
 See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate 
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. OF POLITICS 401, 411-12 (1986).  
20
 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176  (considering “whether an Act repugnant to the 
Constitution can become the law of the land”). 
21
 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L. J. 1, 21-22. 
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does so it need not defer to other branches’ interpretations of that document.22   
But that reading simply does not speak to other political actors’ obligations to 
defer (or not) to the judiciary’s interpretations.23 
Thomas Jefferson articulated the departmentalist alternative to judicial 
supremacy by refusing to view “judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional 
questions”; rather, he said, “[t]he constitution has erected no such single tribunal . 
. . .  It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within 
themselves.”24  This position better fits Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury.  If the 
power to interpret the Constitution judicial review stems from the performance of 
the Court’s underlying judicial function, then similar authority would seem to 
stem from Congress’s and the President’s performance of their functions.   
The trouble with departmentalism is that constitutional functions often 
overlap.  Congress passes a law, exercising its judgment that the law is 
constitutional, but then someone challenges that law in a court.  Our tradition, 
consolidated when President Nixon turned over the tapes,
25
 is that the authority of 
non-judicial officials to interpret the Constitution for themselves does not extend 
to defying court orders.  That is enough to decide Cooper, given that Governor 
                                                 
22
 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 72-73 (6th ed. 2009). 
23
 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 19, at 406-07 (observing that it is “a long step 
from judicial review—the authority of a court, when deciding cases, to refuse to 
give force to an act of a coordinate branch of government—to judicial supremacy, 
the obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey that ruling but to follow its 
reasoning in future deliberations”). 
24
 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, in 12 PAUL L. 
FORD, ED., THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161-64 (1905).  Three other 
positions have been proposed: legislative supremacy, executive supremacy, and 
“confederational departmentalism.”  See Murphy, supra note 19, at 410-11, 420 
n.28.  Marbury rejected legislative supremacy, and the only serious attempt to 
revive it—by the Radical Republicans of Reconstruction—did not last.  As 
Professor Murphy points out, “constitutionalism is wary of arguments that allow 
popularly elected officials final authority to define substantive rights. . . . One 
does not, as the Italian proverb goes, make the goat one’s gardener.” Id. at 411.  
Few argue for executive supremacy in constitutional interpretation.  On 
“confederational departmentalism,” see infra text accompanying notes 38-Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
25
 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).   
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This “modified version” of departmentalism27 acknowledges that courts 
will often have the last (and binding) word, but it tempers that concession to 
judicial supremacy in two ways.  First, there are many questions that the courts 
cannot decide.  These include disputes over constitutional meaning that never take 
the form of an Article III “case or controversy,” as well as those that are 
nonjusticiable “political questions.”  Although the contemporary Court has tended 
to define “political questions” quite narrowly,28 its restrictive doctrine of standing 
leaves many constitutional disputes outside the federal courts’ jurisdiction. 29 
Second, the doctrinal tests by which courts decide constitutional questions 
frequently incorporate substantial deference to political actors.
30
  John Marshall’s 
test for federal legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, for example, 
largely accepted legislative judgments of “necessity” as binding on the courts.31 
A thornier difficulty stems from the distinction between the judgment and 
precedential force of judicial decisions.  Political actors may not defy judicial 
pronouncements of constitutional meaning when they are parties to a judgment in 
a litigated case, but what about when they are not?  Can they simply ignore the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation and continue to act according to their own 
reading?  If there had been no judicial decree in Cooper, then Governor Faubus’s 
action in excluding the black students from Central High School would have 
defied the precedential force of Brown but contravened no judgment.   Some 
opponents of judicial supremacy have suggested that a decision’s res judicata 
force is all that binds, and that political actors have no obligation to follow a 
                                                 
26
 See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. 
Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 394. 
27
 Murphy, supra note 19, at417. 
28
 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1241 (2012); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962). 
29
 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
30
 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) 
(describing the “rational basis” standard for constitutional claims not involving a 
suspect classification or a fundamental right). 
31
 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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This suggestion founders on the fact that courts hold government officials 
liable all the time for violating constitutional interpretations pronounced in 
litigation to which they were not parties. As Dan Farber has pointed out, “[i]t is 
simply wrong to say that constitutional rules can be violated with impunity until 
after entry of an enforcement decree.”33  Both state and federal officials may be 
sued for damages when they violate the Constitution, and they will be liable if 
they violated “clearly established law”—even if the relevant constitutional 
meaning is “established” only by judicial opinions.34  This retrospective liability 
rests on a constitutional wrong occurring at a time when the official was not 
subject to any judicial decree.  Such liability makes sense only if governmental 




The remedial law reflects a pragmatic balance between respect for 
political actors’ authority to interpret the Constitution and the rule-of-law interests 
in preventing infringements of individuals’ rights.  When courts issue prospective 
decrees against governmental officials, they apply their own unmediated view of 
constitutional meaning; when courts impose retrospective liability for violation of 
a prior precedent, however, non-judicial actors have a “good faith” or 
“reasonableness” defense.  This provides some interpretive leeway for 
government officials operating in areas in which the Constitution’s meaning 
remains ambiguous or disputed.  At the same time, government officials may not 
act with impunity against persons who have not already secured an injunction 
against unconstitutional action.
36
  Such remedies are a significant departure from 
departmentalism; after all, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is measured 
against judicial precedents.  That this departure is so well established
37
 
                                                 
32
 See, e.g., Meese, supra note 8; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263-64 
(1962) (arguing that Southern officials were bound to accept Brown only when 
they became parties to specific judicial decrees). 
33
 Farber, supra note 26, at 405. 
34
 See generally HART AND WECHSLER, supra  note __, at 1002-04.  
35
 See Farber, supra note 26, at 405-06. 
36
 See id., at 408. 
37
 See id. (noting the widespread view that government officials are not bound by 
judicial precedents absent a litigated decree, but stating that “it would be hard to 
find a more ill-founded statement about the law”). 
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demonstrates the extent to which our constitutional regime sees some degree of 
judicial supremacy as necessary to the rule of law. 
A final point about departmentalism:  There is no logical reason to restrict 
the power to interpret the Constitution to branches of the federal government.  
Professor Murphy equated “confederational departmentalism”—which entails 
only that state governmental officials, like federal ones, must interpret the 
Constitution in the course of their own duties—with “nullification,” which “held 
the states to be the final interpreters.” 38   That hardly follows.  After all, 
Congress’s departmental right to interpret the Constitution when it legislates is 
not the same thing as legislative supremacy.  State officials’ constitutional 
interpretations are subject to the same constraints that federal non-judicial 
interpretations are—that is, they remain subject to the possibility of federal 
judicial review, including retrospective damages liability when state officials 
violate clearly established law. Governor Faubus was not wrong to disagree with 
the Supreme Court in Cooper simply because he was a state official.  The 
problem was that he interfered with a federal court order in a pending case—and 
that he got the meaning of the Constitution wrong. 
B. Judicial Efficacy and the “Hollow Hope” 
 A quite different challenge to judicial supremacy concerns the practical 
limits of judicial efficacy rather than the theoretical limits of judicial authority.  
Alexander Hamilton famously said that “the judiciary . . . will always be the least 
dangerous [branch] to the political rights of the Constitution,” because it “has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or 
of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”39  “It 
may truly be said to have neither force nor will,” Hamilton insisted, “but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for 
the efficacy of its judgments.” 40   Working in this Hamiltonian tradition, 
contemporary analysts have persuasively questioned the courts’ ability to effect 
significant social change without assistance from other institutional actors. 
 The most prominent critic in this vein, Gerald Rosenberg, emphasizes the 
limits of the Court’s accomplishment in Brown.41   That case held segregated 
schooling unconstitutional; its remedial sequel ordered segregated school districts 
                                                 
38
 Murphy, supra note 19, at 420 n.28 (emphasis added); see also id. (arguing that 
“the Civil War effectively invalidated such claims”). 
39
 The Federalist No. 78, at 522 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
40
 Id. at 523. 
41
 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-106 (1991). 
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to integrate.  Follow-on decisions not only rejected state officials’ right to 
challenge Brown but held efforts to circumvent it unconstitutional. 
42
 In all these 
cases, Professor Rosenberg points out, “the Court had spoken clearly and 
forcefully.”43  Moreover, during the ten-year period after Brown, Congress and 
the Executive remained largely silent on desegregation; hence, “[t]he decade from 
1954 to 1964 provides close to an ideal setting for measuring the contribution of 
the courts vis-à-vis Congress and the executive branch in desegregating public 
schools.”44  The results are striking—and quite sobering to notions of judicial 
supremacy.  In the Southern states, “[f]or ten years, 1954-64, virtually nothing 
happened.  Ten years after Brown only 1.2 percent of black schoolchildren in the 
South attended school with whites.”45  The situation radically changed, however, 
once Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which authorized the Attorney 
General to bring federal desegregation suits on behalf of individuals, and the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which provided a huge pot of federal 
aid money to public school districts but made that money contingent on steps 
toward desegregation.  By the 1972-73 school year, over 91 percent of black 
schoolchildren attended school with whites.
46
  Rosenberg concluded that “Brown 
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are impotent to produce 
significant social reform.”47 
 One might offer a number of rejoinders to Professor Rosenberg’s account, 
the most persuasive being that judicial actions—particularly the Brown 
decision—play a catalytic role by inspiring social movements and spurring other 
governmental actors to action.  Historian David Garrow has written, for example, 
of “the direct influence of Brown on the instigation of the 1955 Montgomery 
[bus] boycott. Almost every significant black Montgomery activist of that time 
has without prompting spoken of Brown's importance for the bus protesters.”48  
                                                 
42
 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Goss v. Board of Education of 
Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 
(1964). 
43
 ROSENBERG, supra note 41, at 45. 
44
 Id. at 49. 
45
 Id. at 52. 
46
 See id. at 50.  One may quibble with Professor Rosenberg’s generous definition 
of “desegregation,” but the point is the magnitude of the change in that measure 
of desegregation over time.   
47
 Id. at 71. 
48
 David Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1994).  But see Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 
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Moreover, judicial decisions may play a more central role in particular settings—
for example, in defending reformers from attacks and, more generally, in 
protecting the sorts of political freedoms that make reform possible.
49
  But in each 
of these scenarios, judges play a supporting role to non-judicial actors, 
particularly broad social movements, that pursue their constitutional vision 
primarily outside the courts.  Vigorous debate persists concerning the extent to 
which judicial decisions matter out in the world, but no one believes anymore that 
constitutionalism inside the courts can go it alone. 
C. Popular Constitutionalism 
 The most prominent contemporary theories of constitutionalism outside 
the courts now parade under the banner of “popular constitutionalism.” Popular 
constitutionalists are highly critical of judicial review, although they differ in their 
prescriptions.  Mark Tushnet proposes “taking the Constitution away from the 
courts” entirely, while Larry Kramer proposes “judicial review without judicial 
supremacy.” 50  Both urge that people outside the professional community of 
lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats should play a greater role in constitutional 
interpretation.  But popular constitutionalism’s proponents remain resolutely 
ambiguous about the affirmative meaning of their theory—that is, the manner in 
which “the People themselves,” in Larry Kramer’s phrase, can implement their 
own views of constitutional meaning. 
 Professor Tushnet’s thesis is the easier to parse.  He proposes that the 
Supreme Court simply swear off judicial review,
51
 leaving political actors to 
interpret the Constitution for themselves in the course of political debate.  He also 
introduces a distinction between a “thin Constitution”—the good parts, 
comprising mostly the Preamble and the Declaration of Independence—and a 
“thick constitution” consisting of “detailed provisions describing how the 
government is to be organized.”52  “Populist constitutional law vindicates the thin 
constitution,” Tushnet says; is is “a law oriented to realizing the principles of the 
                                                                                                                                     
7, 82 n. 353 (1994) (concluding that “the Brown decision was a relatively 
unimportant motivating factor for the civil rights movement”). 
49
 See, e.g., New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 378 U.S. 254 (1964) (relying on 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to prevent use of libel litigation 
to deter coverage of the civil rights movement by news organizations); Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning convictions of civil rights protesters 
involved in lunch counter sit-ins on due process grounds). 
50
 See TUSHNET, supra note 9; KRAMER, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
51
 See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 154. 
52
 Id. at 9-12. 
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Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble.”53  In the absence 
of judicial review, this thin constitution—the “fundamental guarantees of 
equality, freedom of expression, and liberty”—would guide political actors in 
fulfilling the social project begun by the Declaration.
54
 
Professor Tushnet’s distinction between the “thick” and “thin” 
constitutions seems to play a pivotal role in populist constitutionalism. 
Presumably populist mobilization, necessary to make the views of the broader 
people count in constitutional debate, is unlikely with respect to the institutional 
detail that comprises the thick constitution; these details, in his view, do not “thrill 
the heart.”55  It is true that Madison did not stress judicial review as a mechanism 
for enforcing the Constitution’s institutional structure,56 and later theorists have 
urged that principles of federalism and separation of powers can be left to 
“political safeguards.”57   As I discuss in Part II, this sort of political enforcement 
itself represents an important form of constitutionalism outside the courts.   
And yet much of the key business of judicial review involves the policing 
of institutional boundary disputes.
58
  Erin Delaney and Barry Friedman have 
argued that the Supreme Court’s pivotal role in constitutional interpretation 
developed out of the need to referee federalism disputes between the national 
government and the states.
59
  And the Court hears a significant number of cases 
each term involving the preemption of state law by federal statutes under the 
                                                 
53
 Id. at 12, 181. 
54
 Id. at 11, 31. 
55
 Id. at 10.   
56
 See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 39, at 347-53 (James Madison) (stressing 
non-judicial checks and balances). 
57
 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role 
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).   
58
 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (rejecting arguments 
that a dispute over whether the President or Congress had power to dictate the 
contents of a passport issued to a child born in Jerusalem was a nonjusticiable 
political question). 
59
 See Barry Friedman & Erin Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal 
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011). 




60—a provision that Professor Tushnet would relegate to the 
“thick” constitution but that formed a central part of the Founders’ design.  The 
point is twofold:  First, it is not at all clear that one could eliminate judicial review 
of these institutional boundary issues without profoundly altering the operation of 
the governmental system in ways that popular constitutionalists have not fully 
investigated.  Second, the Founders viewed the structural provisions of the thick 
constitution—the proposal of 1789, which lacked a Bill of Rights, much less a 
Fourteenth Amendment—as the key to vindicating the principles of the thin 
constitution.
61
  The Preamble, after all, is only a preamble.  To say that the 
Constitution’s institutional arrangements should be vindicated neither by judicial 
review nor by populist constitutionalism is to tear the heart out of their 
constitutional project. 
It is not surprising, then, that Professor Tushnet quickly points out that a 
world without constitutional judicial review might nonetheless preserve means for 
courts to police boundaries and check arbitrary governmental behavior.
62
  But it is 
unclear why statutory or common law review would not raise the same problems 
that lead populist scholars to criticize judicial review in the first place.  Is the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in administrative law really less open-ended 
and judge-empowering than the various doctrines of constitutional law?  The most 
controversial case of the present Supreme Court term is Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.,
63
 which concerns whether religiously-oriented corporations that 
object to certain forms of contraception are entitled to an exemption from the 
contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act.  The difficulties of judicial 
review in that case are hardly lessened by the fact that the plaintiffs’ primary 
claims are under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—a statute64—rather than 
the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.  In any event, relying on non-
constitutional forms of review to check political actors is neither “populist” nor 
“outside the courts.” 
                                                 
60
 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption 
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253. 
61
 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover 
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277, 1284-
85 (2004). 
62
 See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 163-65 (pointing out that “[a] great deal of what 
we in the United States know as constitutional law parades in Great Britain as 
administrative law”).   
63
 No. 13-354 (October Term 1013). 
64
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. 
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Dean Kramer’s popular constitutionalism would not abolish judicial 
review outright; instead, he proposes “judicial review without judicial 
supremacy.”65  As I have already discussed, one may wonder how much judicial 
supremacy there really is in contemporary America; so many situations arise in 
which judicial review is unlikely or judicial remedies are limited that our system 
resembles Professor Murphy’s “modified” departmentalism. Kramer’s 
prescription appears to add two related elements.  First, he evidently believes that 
the substantive standard of judicial review should be more deferential in particular 
areas—especially the aspects of federalism doctrine that limit national power.66  
Second, he would subject the Supreme Court to the ultimate check of popular 
will.  He urges his countrymen to “insist[] that the Supreme Court is our servant 
and not our master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much 
deference, but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what 
the Constitution means and not the reverse.” At the end of the day, Kramer insists, 
“[t]he Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land on constitutional law. 
We are.”67 
It is hard to quarrel with Dean Kramer’s plea for the public to take a 
greater interest in constitutional law, but beyond that it is hard to know what to 
make of his proposal.  He points out that “[t]he Constitution leaves room for 
countless political responses to an overly assertive Court: Justices can be 
impeached, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of 
jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome 
new responsibilities or revise its procedures.”68  These prescriptions are a recipe 
for exponential escalation of the partisan rancor that has divided Washington, 
D.C. in the past several years.  But Kramer also cites incidents of “extralegal 
violence” and “mobbing” as “traditional forms of popular constitutionalism.”69   
Scot Powe points out in a devastating review that the most prominent 
example of Kramerian popular constitutionalism in recent memory is the South’s 
“Massive Resistance” to the Court’s decision in Brown. 70   Resistance took 
multiple forms, from the “Southern Manifesto,” signed by eighty percent of 
Southern senators and representatives, criticizing the Court’s constitutional 
                                                 
65
 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 249. 
66
 See Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 138-53 (2001). 
67
 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 248. 
68
 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 249.   
69
 Id. at 110. 
70
 L. A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone 
Care)? 83 TEXAS L. REV. 855, 866-70 (2005) (book review). 
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interpretation in Brown, to the state laws purporting to block Brown’s 
implementation through “interposition” or circumvent its mandate through 
various dodges, to the mob outside Central High School in Little Rock seeking to 
intimidate black students and prevent them from entering.  Dean Kramer does not 
discuss massive resistance, and he offers no criteria that might distinguish it from 
legitimate instances of popular constitutionalism.
71
  Just as it has become 
impossible to advocate a theory of constitutional interpretation that cannot support 
Brown,
72
 it is hard to take seriously a theory of interpretive authority that 
condones the South’s massive resistance to that decision. 
It is worth noting that despite the moniker, “popular constitutionalism” is a 
highly elite and almost entirely academic movement.  “[S]upporters of judicial 
supremacy are today’s aristocrats,” accuses Larry Kramer—the former dean of 
the Stanford Law School and now President of the multi-billion dollar Hewlett 
Foundation.
73
  Of course, most populist movements have elite leadership.  But 
there is little evidence that the distrust of judicial review felt by these scholars is 
widely shared.   A leading survey taken in 2001—the year after Bush v. Gore—
found “a remarkably high level of loyalty toward the Supreme Court on the part 
of most Americans.”74  In particular, 69.2 percent of respondents agreed with the 
                                                 
71
 See id. at 870.  In an essay generally defending Kramer, Mark Tushnet seems to 
concede that massive resistance counts as popular constitutionalism; he suggests 
only that other popular mobilizations, such as the civil rights movement itself, 
may have done enough good to outweigh the harm of massive resistance.  See 
Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 991, 994 n.10, 1004 n.49 (2006).  Of course, one can acknowledge the role 
of social movements in persuading lawyers and judges to change their view of the 
Constitution and in prompting the political branches to add their enforcement 
powers to judicial remedies without condoning outright defiance of judicial orders 
or “extralegal violence.” 
72
 See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 156. 
73
 Similarly, Mark Tushnet is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at 
the Harvard Law School.  My own view is that this couldn’t have happened to a 
nicer (or more deserving) guy, but then I am not a populist. 
74
 James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring 
Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 358 
(2003).  Professor Gibson performed a later survey in 2005 that confirmed his 
earlier findings.  See James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the United States 
Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 532 
(2007) (finding that “the U.S. Supreme Court is widely supported by the 
American people, and that support has little to do with ideology or partisanship”); 
see also Manoj Mate & Matthew Wright, The 2000 Presidential Election 
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proposition that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to say what the 
Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree with the 
Court’s decision.”75  Moreover, “a great deal of loyalty to the institution can be 
found even among those who have hardly any confidence in the Court.  For 
instance, the vast majority of those who have little confidence in the Court are 
nonetheless unwilling to support doing away with the institution.” 76   These 
findings strongly suggest that, even if public confidence in the Court’s present 
performance fluctuates,
77
 the Court’s diffuse support is sufficiently strong to 
make calls for popular constitutionalism distinctly unpopular. 
 Proponents of popular constitutionalism generally acknowledge the broad 
public support for judicial review; as Dean Kramer puts it, “everyone nowadays 
seems willing to accept the Court’s word as final.” 78  Kramer offers several 
reasons: “heightened skepticism about popular democracy occasioned by 
twentieth-century totalitarianism; the historical anomaly of the liberal Warren 
Court; two generations of near consensus about judicial supremacy among 
intellectuals and opinion-makers on both the left and the right (not to mention 
among high school civics teachers).”79  One may or may not agree with these 
reasons, but it is implausible to describe 69.2 percent of the population as 
“today’s aristocrats.”  And even if we can attribute such deep-seated public 
approval of the Court to false consciousness, it means as a practical matter that 
radical visions of popular constitutionalism are unlikely to get off the ground. 
 There is another possibility, however.  The public may approve of judicial 
review because it senses that, over time, the Court is in fact reasonably responsive 
                                                                                                                                     
Controversy, in NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN, & PATRICK J. EGAN, EDS., 
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 333 (2008) (concluding 
that strong public support for the Court had recovered from any loss of legitimacy 
occasioned by the Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore). 
75
 Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, supra note 74 at 358 (Table 2). 
76
 Id. at 361 (emphasis in original). 
77
 The latest Rasmussen poll has 28 percent of respondents saying that the 
Supreme Court is doing a “good” or “excellent” job, while 26 percent rated the 
Court’s performance as “poor.”  Rasmussen Reports, Supreme Court Update, 
March 26, 2014, available at 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/supr
eme_court_update.  By comparison, Congress’s numbers were 7 percent “good” 
or “excellent” and 64 percent “poor.” Id.  
78
 KRAMER, supra note 9, at 228; see also id. at 232, 333 nn. 5-8 (citing the same 
surveys cited in note 74, supra). 
79
 Id. at 232. 
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to views about the Constitution held by “the People themselves.”  That is the 
thesis of Barry Friedman’s recent history of the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and public opinion.
80
  Professor Friedman concludes that “[o]ver time, 
through a dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the 
considered judgment of the American people regarding their most fundamental 
values.  It frequently is the case that when judges rely on the Constitution to 
invalidate the actions of the other branches of government, they are enforcing the 
will of the American people.” 81   On this view, constitutionalism inside and 
outside the courts are not wholly different categories; rather, each influences the 
other over time.   
As Friedman points out, moreover, this dialogue is a way of managing 
“the intractable tension between majority rule and constitutionalism that is innate 
to the American system of government.”82  It may well be that the American 
people do not simply want their own way at all times; rather, they also want to be 
bound by law to respect constitutional processes and minority rights.
83
  Notably, 
today’s constitutionally-oriented social movements of both left and right—such as 
the gay rights movement, proponents of gun rights, and the Tea Party—have not 
attacked and often invited judicial review as part (but only part) of their strategies 
for social change.  At the end of the day, the various academic revolts against 
judicial review have done a valuable service by supplementing our understanding 
of the processes shaping constitutional meaning, but they have hardly displaced 
the courts’ central role.  
II. Constitutionalism in Politics 
 We are unlikely to do away with judicial review, or to adopt drastic 
measures—e.g., impeachments, jurisdiction-stripping—punishing wayward courts 
when they disagree with public opinion on particular questions.  Judicial review is 
simply too much a part of the American fabric, and the academic outrage against 
our moderately conservative Supreme Court that prompts much popular 
constitutionalist writing does not seem to be shared by the general public.  But the 
                                                 
80
 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCE THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
81
 Id. at 367-68. 
82
 Id. at 367. 
83
 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in 
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 27-28 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva Siegel, eds. 
2009); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-8, at 
18-24 (3rd ed. 2000) (discussing the constitutionalist desire to tie oneself to the 
mast). 
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intellectual ferment of popular constitutionalism has shed considerable light on 
the many ways in which constitutionalism outside the courts already plays a 
critical role in our polity.  I discuss four here:  the protection of particular 
constitutional values through political processes and institutional checks; the role 
of social movements in shaping constitutional meaning; resolution of particular 
constitutional controversies in the political branches through processes of 
“constitutional construction”; and the role of “administrative constitutionalism.” 
 These phenomena have a common theme.  They each address 
constitutional questions—that is, issues like the balance of power between state 
and national governments or discrimination against women and racial minorities.  
But these forms of constitutionalism tend to answer those questions through 
extra-constitutional means, by enacting and interpreting statutes or establishing 
conventions of governmental practice.  They thus highlight the extent to which 
constitutionalism flourishes in our polity not simply outside the courts, but 
outside the Constitution itself. 
A. Political Safeguards 
 American debates about the meaning of the Constitution’s federal 
structure reproduce in microcosm the larger debates about the legitimacy of 
judicial review itself.
84
  Writing in 1954, Herbert Wechsler challenged the need 
for judicial review of federalism issues, suggesting that “the Court is on weakest 
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in 
the interest of the states, whose representatives control the legislative process and, 
by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of 
Congress.”85 A quarter-century later, Jesse Choper urged the Court to abandon 
judicial review of both federalism and separation of powers issues entirely in 
order to preserve its political capital for individual rights cases.
86
  Both scholars 
relied on the expectation that structural values can be adequately preserved 
through a form of constitutionalism outside the courts—that is, the political and 
institutional checks and balances that operate through the ordinary political 
process.   
                                                 
84
 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions seem to be what set Dean 
Kramer off.  See, e.g., Kramer, Foreword, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 138-53. 
85
 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. 
L. REV. 543, 559 (1954). 
86
 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
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 Legal scholars have slaughtered forests debating whether political and 
institutional safeguards are sufficient to protect constitutional federalism 
principles (curiously, Dean Choper’s suggestion has never been taken all that 
seriously with respect to separation of powers).
87
  The Court has never accepted 
the view that they are.
88
  But it remains clear that these extra-judicial safeguards 
are the primary mechanisms for protecting structural values.
89
  As Brad Clark has 
explained, “federal lawmaking procedures . . . preserve federalism both by 
making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning lawmaking power 
solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism”—that is, to 
Congress, which in turn is made up of representatives beholden to the States.
90
  
Moreover, a wide variety of wholly extra-constitutional structures, from the 
                                                 
87
 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (criticizing 
Wechsler’s version of the political safeguards argument, and substituting an 
argument based on political parties); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1459 (2001) (criticizing political safeguards arguments generally); Lynn A. Baker 
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 
DUKE L. J. 75 (2001) (arguing that there is no reason to suspend judicial review 
for federalism but not other constitutional issues). One suspects that the lack of an 
equivalent debate about separation of powers may be attributed to shared 
concerns on both Left and Right about institutional overreaching among the 
branches of the federal government. The contrasting enthusiasm for the “political 
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liberal legal scholars viewed federalism as a discredited principle unworthy of 
respect. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67 (2001) 
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 The closest the Court has come is Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), 
which rejected an extra-textual limit on federal regulation of state governmental 
institutions themselves.  But in other cases, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
have heeded Professor Wechsler’s own concession that the Court may not 
“decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called 
upon to face the question in the course of ordinary litigation.” Wechsler, supra 
note 85, at 559.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1349, 1353-55 (2001). 
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 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001). 
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structure of the political parties to state lobbying organizations like the National 
Governors Association to the role of state bureaucrats implementing federal 




 In a sense, political safeguards for structural principles are not 
“constitutionalism” at all.  Members of Congress who oppose federal legislation 
typically do so because they think it is bad policy, or because it threatens the 
interests of their constituents—not because they think it contravenes 
constitutional principles of federalism. And state bureaucrats who push 
implementation of federal programs typically do so for policy reasons, not 
constitutional ones. Nonetheless, the structure of the lawmaking process protects 
state autonomy by making it relatively easy for opponents of federal legislation to 
block federal legislation; likewise, the structure of federal regulatory programs 
provides numerous opportunities for influence, foot-dragging, and outright 
subversion by state officials charged with implementing federal laws.
92
  These 
dynamics, in turn, protect the constitutional value of state autonomy.  This is 
constitutionalism not simply outside the courts but on auto-pilot, dating back at 
least to Madison’s reliance on “opposite and rival interests . . . in all the 
subordinate distributions of power” to hold the constitutional structure in place.93 
B. Social Movements 
 Much constitutional scholarship in recent years has focused on the role of 
social movements—such as the African American civil rights movement, the 
women’s rights movement, or the movement for gun rights—in shaping 
constitutional meaning.   As Reva Siegel has explained, “[s]ocial movements 
change the ways Americans understand the Constitution.  Social movement 
conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms 
of constitutional understanding—a dynamic that guides officials interpreting the 
open-textured language of the Constitution’s rights guarantees.” 94   Social 
movements may reinforce and extend the constitutional vision articulated by the 
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Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 
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Court, as the civil rights movement did in the years after Brown, or they may run 
counter to established constitutional interpretations, as the gun rights movement 
did in the years prior to District of Columbia v. Heller.
95
  In either case, they 
represent a classic form of constitutionalism outside the courts. 
 While the importance of social movements is obvious, the precise ways in 
which they shape constitutional meaning—in particular, the ways in which a 
movement’s vision gets translated into constitutional law—is less clear.  Jack 
Balkin has identified two distinct institutional paths by which social movements 
may influence the development of constitutional law.  The first runs through 
political parties and judicial appointments:  “social movements . . . influence the 
two major political parties, which, in turn, control the system of judicial 
appointments.”96  Hence, social activism “leads to the appointment of judges who 
sincerely believe that the best interpretation of the Constitution is one that 
happens to be sympathetic with social movement claims.”  Professor Balkin and 
Sanford Levinson have called this mechanism “partisan entrenchment,” reflecting 
the likelihood that judges appointed by political partisans may outlast the political 
force of the social movement that brought them to the bench.
97
 
 The second path involves the influence of social movements on “the 
values of national elites.”98  According to Professor Balkin, “[s]ocial movement 
politics play a crucial role in getting both popular and elite opinion to view the 
world differently and to acknowledge changes as salient and important.”99  This 
path differs from the first in that “[a]ppeals to national elite values try to change 
constitutional doctrine by changing the minds of sitting judges,” which tend to 
reflect elite opinion, “while the strategy of partisan entrenchment tries to change 
the judges.”100  Other institutional mechanisms may also be important.  As I 
discuss further in Section D, social movements may also succeed in enacting 
legislation, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which in turn shape the 
development of constitutional law. 
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 The contrast between this conception of popular constitutionalism and 
Dean Kramer’s is instructive.  Kramer advocated extraordinary measures to 
disobey, overturn, or intimidate the courts; the popular constitutionalism of 
Professors Siegel, Balkin, and others, by contrast, operates by persuading the 
institutions of government (including courts) to act through established channels 
(including judicial review).  As such, the latter view is likely to be far more 
congenial to an American public that retains considerable respect for both the 
courts and the role of judicial review. 
 Broad-based forms of popular constitutionalism may be particularly 
influential with respect to principles of constitutional law that are 
“underenforced” in current doctrine.101  Larry Sager has demonstrated that much 
constitutional doctrine stops short of implementing the full normative content of 
particular constitutional provisions, instead deferring to political actors on 
institutional grounds.
102
  Examples in current law would include the constitutional 
limits on delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies, 
discrimination against non-suspect classes, and legislation impairing the 
obligation of contracts.  In each of these areas, courts have not felt confident in 
substituting their own judgment for those of the governmental actors subject to 
judicial review.
103
  The extent to which any given constitutional principle is 
underenforced, however, is historically contingent; many principles have been 
both rigorously enforced and underenforced at different periods of our history.
104
  
When the underlying constitutional culture that had supported judicial deference 
changes, the Court’s doctrine may change too.105   
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Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
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Constitutional doctrine frequently trades on notions of what is 
“normal.”106  In the middle of the last century, Americans tended to look to the 
national government for solutions to social problems—an expectation reflected in 
high trust levels for national institutions compared to state and local ones.
107
  But 
conceptions of normalcy can change, often in response to the efforts of social 
movements.  The Court’s more vigorous enforcement of federalism limits on 
national power has occurred contemporaneously with a significant shift in public 
trust away from national institutions toward state and local ones and a more 
general skepticism of national regulation reflected in the Tea Party movement.
108
  
Likewise, the gay rights movement has changed conceptions of what counts as a 
“marriage” or a “family” in ways that are beginning to be reflected in 
constitutional doctrine.
109
   Participants in these movements need not think of 
themselves as interpreting the Constitution in order to shape the way that 
constitutional principles are implemented. 
C. Constitutional Construction  
 Non-judicial actors do not simply interpret the Constitution; sometimes 
they have to fill in the gaps.  Keith Whittington’s concept of constitutional 
“construction” addresses this function, which rests on the fact that “[t]he various 
branches of government not only share overlapping powers . . . they also possess 
distinctive perspectives, resources, and capacities that help to shape political 
outcomes.”110  To be sure, some of the work that political branch officials do is 
interpretive in the same sense as judicial interpretation.  But often political actors 
do something quite different.  As Professor Whittington explains, “constructions 
do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden meaning in the founding document; 
rather they elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive 
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meaning, where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of 
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”111 
 Just as social movements may have the most influence in elevating 
constitutional principles that were previously underenforced, so too constitutional 
construction has the most room to operate in areas where the constitutional text is 
indeterminate.  Over the course of our history, the political branches have had to 
confront numerous questions that are constitutional in character, but on which the 
Constitution and its associated interpretive materials provide no answer.  
Examples include the proper standard for impeaching federal judges or the scope 
of the President’s power to remove executive officials once appointed and 
confirmed by the Senate.
112
 While interpretation involves a search for preexisting 
meaning by an ideally objective interpreter, construction is a process by which 
political actors with partisan stakes create meaning within the space afforded by 
constitutional indeterminacy.  Judges tend to play a minimal or nonexistent role in 
this process. 
 The notion of constitutional construction by political actors raises as many 
questions as it answers.  One concerns the precedential force of political practice 
when the legality of the construction is challenged in court.
113
  One response 
would be to say that because legitimate construction occurs in the interstices that 
the constitutional text leaves open, one prerequisite of a construction’s validity is 
that the space is, in fact, open.  If the underlying constitutional principles are not, 
in fact, indeterminate, then their interpretive meaning must control.  One might 
draw an analogy to the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which requires 
courts to defer to constructions of federal statutes by administrative agencies—but 
only if the underlying statutory provision is ambiguous.
114
  On the other hand, a 
settled construction by political actors is likely to influence the way that a court 
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reads the underlying constitutional principles.  And that construction may, in 
some circumstances, have staying power even in the event of judicial invalidation. 
 The Court’s decision on the legislative veto provides an example.  A 
perennial problem in separation of powers law concerns the extent to which 
Congress may delegate lawmaking power to the executive and the means by 
which it may control the exercise of that power.  The Constitution says little 
directly about this question, and what it does say—that all of the national 
legislative power is vested in Congress
115—seems impracticable under modern 
circumstances.  Beginning in the 1930s, Congress qualified some of its 
delegations to the Executive with legislative veto provisions, which allowed it to 
override particular executive actions pursuant to delegated authority without 
going through the difficult procedure specified in Article I for enacting a new 
statute.
116
  By the 1980s, nearly 200 legislative veto provisions were scattered 
throughout the U.S. Code; it seems fair to say that although the President 
continued to raise constitutional objections from time to time, Congress had 
succeeded in securing practical acquiescence to its construction.  This did not stop 
the Court from holding the legislative veto unconstitutional, however, in INS v. 
Chadha,
117
 on the ground that it permitted Congress to act with legal force in a 
way that departed from the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure” specified in Article I. Nonetheless, Congress has continued to enact 
legislative veto provisions in the years after Chadha, and the executive branch 
largely complies with them as a matter of practical necessity.
118
  Although the 
Chadha decision means that these vetoes are no longer legally enforceable by 
judicial order, the political branches’ construction retains life outside the courts.  
D. Administrative Constitutionalism 
 A final approach to constitutionalism outside the courts rejects the 
“romantic understanding of the judge-enforced Constitution” in favor of “a more 
realistic view” centered on the enactment and implementation of federal 
statutes.
119
  William Eskridge and John Ferejohn begin their account of 
democratic constitutionalism with the observation that “the written Constitution 
left many things essentially unresolved, including the extent of the franchise for 
federal and state elections, the precise authority of the president, the extent and 
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reach of the federal judiciary, and the role of judges in enforcing rights.”120  
Moreover, “the Constitution’s high hurdle for formal amendment limited the 
extent to which the continuing struggle over the content of our democratic 
constitutionalism . . . could be resolved as a matter of Large ‘C’ Constitutional 
law. “121  Conventional constitutional theory holds that these gaps have been filled 
in largely through the process of judicial review, with common law elaboration 
providing the necessary play in the joints that allows an old and hard-to-amend 
constitution to remain relevant to contemporary society.  Professors Eskridge and 
Ferejohn, by contrast, contend that the primary instruments of constitutional 
change have been statutes, executive orders and agency rules, and treaties and 
other agreements.   
 Like many of the other accounts of popular constitutionalism already 
considered, the “administrative constitutionalism’ of Professors Eskridge and 
Ferejohn is avowedly ideological in motivation.  The conventional judge-centered 
account, they argue, has a libertarian bias—judges are good at elaborating 
individual rights and structural principles that check the power of government, but 
bad at “address[ing] the duties of government to create and guarantee affirmative 
and positive legal regimes that provide security and structure for American public 
finance, families, employment and commercial activities, old-age and disability 
insurance, and national defense.” 122   These duties—reminiscient of Professor 
Tushnet’s “thin constitution” consisting of the Declaration of Independence and 
the Preamble
123—are best vindicated through our “Republic of Statutes.”124 
 Administrative constitutionalism is a form of popular constitutionalism in 
the sense that “the ultimate form of political agency is found in We the People, 
acting through regular elections and the associated devices of political parties but 
also by means of political associations and interest groups and through popular 
social movements.” 125   Nonetheless, “the primary governmental actors are 
legislators, executive officials, and administrators” who promulgate, interpret, and 
implement statutes and other subconstitutional legal directives.
126
  Hence the term 
“administrative constitutionalism.” 
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 The great virtue of this approach is that it allows conceptual space for the 
two distinct faces of constitutionalism, even if Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn 
do not give those faces equal prominence.  One face, emphasized by popular 
constitutionalists, views the Constitution as “the vehicle by which a democratic 
polity develops its own fundamental values.”127  This strand tends to emphasize 
government empowerment, and it looks naturally—as Eskridge, Ferejohn, and 
Tushnet all do—to the statements of governmental purpose in the Preamble.  The 
other face of constitutionalism emphasizes constraint; the Constitution, on this 
view “incorporates a series of rules that impose second-order constraints on the 
first-order policy preferences of the people and their elected representatives and 
executive officials.”128  Stressing constraint tends to shift our focus not only to 
negative liberties against government but also to the structural hurdles that the 
Constitution raises against government action.
129
 
 Like most analytical typologies, this one fails to capture the full 
complexity of the subject.  The equality principle in the Fourteenth Amendment is 
both a constraint on discriminatory government activity and a value to be realized 
through positive government action.  And such Preamble-driven action may be 
necessary to render negative constraints on government effective; public 
education of the citizenry, for instance, plays a critical role in developing not only 
a vibrant marketplace of ideas under the First Amendment but also an informed 
electorate capable of checking politicians at the ballot box.  Nonetheless, the 
difference between the two faces of constitutionalism helps to explain why 
proponents and critics of popular constitutionalism so often talk past one another.  
Popular constitutionalism makes sense for the first face; it is hard to argue that 
unelected judges should have exclusive or even primary authority to define 
national values and pursue the affirmative ends of government.  But external 
constraint on the pursuit of those ends is an important (if not the only) aspect of 
the second face.  Our tradition has generally relied on judges to provide that 
external constraint on political action.
130
 
 Administrative constitutionalism focuses on the government-empowering 
first face of constitutionalism, but it generally does not take strong anti-judicial 
review positions that undermine the Constitution’s external constraint function.   
This leaves room for disaggregating those functions as a matter of constitutional 
theory.  In other work, I have distinguished three primary functions of 
constitutions:  constituting the government (creating governmental institutions 
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and delimiting their jurisdiction, procedures, and powers); creating rights; and 
entrenching certain principles against constitutional change.
131
  A key insight of 
administrative constitutionalism is that all of these functions are performed not 
only by the canonical text of 1789 and its subsequent formal amendments, but 
also by statutes, regulations, and settled government practices.
132
  As Karl 
Llewellyn put it back in 1934, “most of the going framework of our Leviathan is 
hardly adumbrated in the Document.  As a criterion of what our working 
Constitution is, the language fails in both directions.  It affords neither a positive 
nor a negative test.”133 
 Popular constitutionalism encourages political actors to flesh out the 
constitutive framework of our government and to expand the catalog of rights that 
people have.  It may even entrench these reforms, as a practical matter, by 
establishing programs with enduring bases of popular support.
134
  Political actors 
can generally undertake these actions without running afoul of the judge-
dominated constraining face of constitutionalism because the Constitution is 
either silent or permissive on most of the relevant questions.  As Fred Schauer 
puts it, “[t]he Constitution . . . says remarkably little about what the government 
should do, and that is as it should be.”135  The limits are not nonexistent, and 
sometimes efforts to extend the reach of governmental programs, alter 
governmental frameworks, or create new entitlement will run into serious 
constitutional constraints.
136
  But in general the Constitution allows considerable 
room for development and elaboration without implicating the constraining 
function of the courts. 
 This is an important advantage, because theories of popular 
constitutionalism that must disparage the constraining function of judicial review 
risk losing track of something important.  The notion that certain principles 
remain off limits from infraction, no matter how good the intentions of 
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government actors or how sound their policy arguments, still stands at the heart of 
American constitutionalism.   A good theory of popular constitutionalism needs 
an account of constitutional change outside the formal amendment process, a 
theory by which constitutional principles and values can guide the positive actions 
of government, and room for the continuing importance of judicial review’s 
constraining function.   
 It is also worth noting that administrative constitutionalism is not entirely 
a theory of constitutionalism outside the courts.  After all, the statutes, 
administrative regulations, treaties, and the like that flesh out our constitutional 
structure and values are themselves generally subject to judicially interpretation 
and enforcement.  For example, as Cass Sunstein has observed, “Broad 
delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of 
legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed 
largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity 
to whatever statutory directives have been issued.” 137   Administrative 
constitutionalism thus not only leaves room for traditional judicial review in 
constitutional cases, but it also does not get off the ground without expanding the 
reach of judicial review to cover the Constitution outside the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
 Theories of constitutionalism outside the courts have both a positive and a 
negative project.  On the positive side, they remind us that the Constitution 
belongs to all of us—not just judges, but also legislators, bureaucrats, executive 
officials, and private citizens.  All of these actors have both the opportunity and 
the responsibility to interpret and implement constitutional principles, and all of 
these actors have a role in the development of those principles over time.  This 
has always been true, and the Founders knew it well.  But constitutional scholars, 
lawyers and judges are always at risk of forgetting, and the reminder that scholars 
of popular constitutionalism have provided is a valuable contribution indeed. 
 The negative project is to attack judicial review.  Some of this critique 
reflects longstanding concerns about the anti-democratic nature of the institution 
and the indeterminacy of constitutional principle, which leaves room for the entry 
of the judges’ own political preferences.  But the popular constitutionalism 
literature also reflects something of a shift in the orientation of liberal 
constitutional theory.  Perhaps because the judiciary has become more 
conservative than in the heyday of the Warren Court, and perhaps because liberals 
have recently enjoyed somewhat more sway in the political branches than they 
once did, many progressives have come to prefer the constitution outside the 
courts.  Although political liberals once championed the Court’s role in enforcing 
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the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, for example, it has now become 
fashionable for them to reject that role.
138
   We have, in some ways, returned to 
the political alignments of the Progressive Era and the New Deal, when 
conservatives took refuge in the courts and liberals championed action by the 
political branches and the regulatory bureaucracy.  It is sufficient commentary on 
this development to observe that what can change once can change again. 
 As Governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus was correct in undertaking to 
interpret the Constitution for himself and in acting on that interpretation in the 
performance of his official functions.  It is important to get the Constitution right, 
however, and history rightly condemns Faubus because he interpreted the 
Constitution poorly, and in a way that harmed citizens who deserved better.  
Faubus was wrong, moreover, to interfere with the courts’ ultimate settlement 
function in litigated constitutional controversies.  If the Constitution is to continue 
to act as an external constraint on political action, then constitutionalism outside 
the courts can never be wholly autonomous of constitutionalism inside. 
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